Although there are no immediate projects of unconventional gas exploitation using hydraulic fracturing in Switzerland, the issue is on the political agenda. In federalist Switzerland, sub-national entities (cantons) are responsible for attributing the respective concessions to private companies according to the usual regulatory procedure of mineral and gas extraction. Yet, policy change has happened to different degrees in different cantons, including moratoriums and planned bans of hydraulic fracturing techniques. This chapter compares the three cantons of Neuchâtel, Bern and Vaud, where slightly differing regulations are currently in place. Based on the empirical analysis of coalitions, their beliefs and preferences, as well as political and technical information exchange among them, we aim to understand the current policy outputs in the respective cantons, as well as the potential for future policy change. The analysis is based on a written survey among approximately 90 collective actors in the three cantons.
Introduction
Since May 2011, the Swiss energy sector has been challenged by the governmental decision to phase out nuclear energy. As of 2015, nuclear power covered up to 40% of Swiss energy consumption (BFE, 2009 ). A nuclear phase-out thus poses a challenge in terms of alternative energy supply.
Given the success of shale gas extraction in the US (EIA, 2014) , the exploitation of unconventional gas resources could, according to some claims, provide such an alternative in Switzerland. However, as in many other countries (see other chapters of this book), this topic is highly contested in Switzerland. This is due to several reasons. Most importantly, there are still major uncertainties about the risks related to the methods of exploitation of unconventional gas, widely known as hydraulic fracturing.
Uncertainties with respect to the contamination of surface waters, regulation of land use and property rights, or the generation of fugitive methane emissions due to leakages (Stevens, 2010; Jackson et al., 2014) influence the political debate on the regulation of unconventional gas development. What is more, geothermal drilling projects which caused earthquakes at several Swiss sites in the past raise questions about the use of any type of drilling techniques. 1 Hydraulic fracturing has so far not been used in Switzerland to exploit shale or tight gas sources, but there is intense debate among political actors at several levels, including private firms, experts, and the general public. While some local governments, energy suppliers and private firms consider unconventional gas extraction to be a viable, short-term alternative to other non-renewable sources of energy, local itize s' asso iatio s, g ee NGOs a d left-wing parties strongly oppose hydraulic fracturing and unconventional gas extraction. In federalist Switzerland, unlike other European countries (see for instance Chailleux and Moyson on France, in this book), concessions for projects of unconventional gas exploitation are managed in a decentralized way by sub-national units (cantons). This has resulted in some regional variation in public policies addressing hydraulic fracturing and the exploitation of unconventional gas sources.
Based on a comparative case study design, this chapter investigates differences between subnational policy subsystems in relation to their choice of policy instruments used to address hydraulic fracturing. More concretely, we analyze three regional cases in Switzerland with different regulations on unconventional gas development. The canton of Vaud has experience with exploration concessions and concessions for site developments, but currently has a moratorium on unconventional gas exploitation and hydraulic fracturing, and there is little public discussion on the issue. After an important public mobilization against a (non-shale) gas exploration project, the canton of Neuchâtel also introduced a moratorium on all kinds of gas exploration and exploitation, and plans to ban hydraulic fracturing in the next revision of the respective law. There is no specific hydraulic fracturing project in the canton of Bern, but a ban on the technology is foreseen by a directdemocratic instrument, i.e. a popular initiative.
Against this background, we study to what extent the arrival of a new issue like hydraulic fracturing induced a process of policy change. In general, the attribution of exploration and exploitation concessions in the cantons follows a usi ess as usual p o edu e, he e the development of unconventional gas resources through hydraulic fracturing is treated as any other mineral exploitation under the current cantonal regulation. By contrast, a ban or moratorium represents a policy change. In order to understand the different degrees of policy change in terms of regulations (concessions, moratoriums, bans) across the three cases of Vaud, Neuchâtel and Bern, we analyze the respective policy processes leading to the current output. Relying on the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007) , we expect different coalition structures to lead to different policy outputs. In line with the framework of the book, we Our study is based on survey data and tools of social network analysis. It tackles both a to s' beliefs and policy preferences, as well as conflict and cooperation relations among actors involved in unconventional gas regulation. Results suggest that coalition structures help to understand the type of policy output produced by the subsystem. Although there are two coalitions, i.e. an antidevelopment and a pro-development coalition, in all three cases, there are also important differences between them: in the cantons of Neuchâtel and Bern the stricter regulations seem to result from the strength and strategic behavior of the anti-development coalition, while the weaker pro-development coalition is unable to influence policy outputs. By contrast, in the canton of Vaud, we observe some coordination between the coalitions, which enabled them to produce a temporal policy compromise and a slightly more moderate position towards hydraulic fracturing. On a more general level, and similar to the American and Canadian cases (see Heikkila and Weible; Montpetit et al., this book), this study shows the degree of freedom that (Swiss) federalism leaves to sub-national units for producing different solutions when dealing with the same policy problem.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: after a short introduction on the theoretical framework and hypotheses deduced from the Advocacy Coalition Framework, we introduce the issue of unconventional gas regulation in Switzerland and the three case studies. The next section then outlines data and methods. After the presentation of coalition structures and their beliefs, we highlight coordination patterns among coalition members, i.e. political and technical information exchange. In the last two sections, we discuss our results and outline specificities of the Swiss case, as well as more generalizable insights from our study.
New issues, advocacy coalitions and policy change
There is considerable agreement in the public policy literature that the arrival of new issues can interrupt policy stability, challenge the status quo, and potentially induce policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Mintrom and Vergardi, 2005; Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010) . New issues are brought to a subsystem by external events (Birkland, 2006; Nohrstedt, 2008) . On the one hand, they can be inherent to the political system, such as the appearance of a new political party or changes in government. On the other hand, new issues can also stem from the wider socio-economic or socio-technical context, such as a new technology for natural resources extraction, new methods for electricity transportation or the depreciation of a currency (see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; John, 2003; Weible and Sabatier, 2007; Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010) . If these issues are perceived as a challenge to the existing subsystem and successfully pass the political agenda setting stage, they are either addressed through established regulation, or they provoke a policy debate and a policy process leading to a revision of existing law, or even the creation of a new policy subsystem.
This study does not focus on the discussion of how and why new policy subsystems are created.
Instead, it tackles the question of the propensity for policy change within subsystems when a new issue appears on the political agenda. New issues -whether tackled by existing law or not -can present a threat to one or more actors or actor coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Birkland, 2006; Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010) . Typically, actors benefitting from the existing regulation and the distribution of property rights fear that the new issue challenges the existing system. They therefore engage in political negotiations attempting to preserve stability and the status quo. By contrast, actors that did not benefit from the existing regulation are expected to favor policy change.
Following the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), both actors in favor and against policy change are expected to coordinate their actions with actors sharing similar beliefs (regarding the nature and extent of the threat by the new issue, the regulation by which to address the new issue, but also other ideological dimensions). More generally, policy processes and the resulting outputs are shaped by coalitions of actors, as well as their ideologies, preferences, strategies and resources (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007) . A situation in which some actors perceive a new issue as a threat is thus a necessary condition for policy change, but is not sufficient by itself. Several other factors contribute to the propensity for policy change, i.e. to the decision on whether the status quo is maintained or policy change is introduced. In other words, different coalition attributes and subsystem characteristics influence which coalition is more successful in shaping policy outputs, or whether collaborative solutions can be negotiated between coalitions.
Which coalition is most successful in translating beliefs into policy outputs first depends on the degree of disagreement across as well as the degree of agreement within coalitions. Following the ACF, coalition members most importantly share basic worldviews and policy positions. Further, but less importantly, they also agree on instrumental decisions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) .
Strong agreement within a coalition is an important pre-condition for coalition success. Furthermore, the lower the levels of conflict and disagreement across coalitions, the greater the potential for a policy compromise is (Ingold and Varone, 2012; Fischer, 2015) . Based on shared beliefs, coalition members then engage in mutual coordination (Schlager, 1995; Henry, 2011) . Coordination patterns can take different forms and are usually conceptualized as relational patterns within and across coalition boundaries (Sabatier and Weible, 2005; Henry, 2011; Beyers and Braun, 2014) . Going one step further, Leifeld and Schneider (2012) (Beyers and Braun, 2014; Fischer, 2014) .
Furthermore, the institutional context also influences oalitio s' success or failure. Most importantly, the political system and country-specific institutions allow or hinder coalitions to activate veto-points in order to block policy change (Tsebelis, 1995; Ingold and Varone, 2012) , but also to overrule governmental decisions. Coalition strategies of allying with other actors -typically public authorities -that have some control over arenas and veto-points are thus important. Finally, the success of coalitions in coordinating and designing activities also strongly depends on the resources at their disposition. Formal decision-making power, expert knowledge and financial resources are just some of the resources that impact a oalitio 's influence on the policy process (for an overview, see Sabatier and Weible, 2007) .
In what follows, we systematically investigate the influence of coalition structures and attributes in the context of a new issue, hydraulic fracturing, on policy-making in Swiss sub-national constituencies. We then highlight the degree of current policy change, as well as the propensity for future policy change, and relate this to the observed coalition structure in the respective sub-system.
Swiss institutions, politics and unconventional gas regulation
Switzerland is often characterized as an ideal-typical consensus democracy in which many different interests are taken into account during the elaboration of policy solutions (Lijphart, 1990; Vatter, 2009 ). Institutions such as federalism or direct-democratic instruments offer potential veto points to coalitions defending both the status-quo and policy change. Veto points allow actors to defy a policy solution favored by a dominant coalition that traditionally shaped policy outputs and defended the status quo (Tsebelis, 1995) .
On the one hand, direct-democratic instruments such as popular initiatives or referenda hang like a Damocles' sword over Swiss decision-making processes (Sciarini et al., 2015) , forcing public authorities and traditionally dominant coalitions to elaborate compromises and negotiate mutually acceptable policy solutions with competing coalitions. Thus, if coalitions want to be able to translate their policy beliefs and preferences into policy outputs, they need to either take into account some of the beliefs of their competitors, or be large enough to avoid, or win, a popular referendum (Fischer, 2015) .
On the other hand, the federalist setting also contributes to the power-dispersing institutional situation in Switzerland. The federalist subsidiarity principle gives cantons important degrees of freedom in policy design and implementation in many policy sectors. Whenever responsibilities and tasks lie at the cantonal level, there exist sub-national policy subsystems in the respective policy sector. Cantonal subsystems are often only partly embedded in the respective national subsystem, and they might overlap with several other policy sectors. In such a multi-level and cross-sectoral structure, different cantonal policy subsystems may produce different or even diverging policy solutions when addressing the very same societal or environmental problem. This makes the study of coalition structures and policy processes in different sub-national subsystems in Switzerland particularly interesting.
The exploitation and use of underground natural resources, and more specifically minerals and gases, is regulated in a decentralized way in Switzerland. Cantons usually have a mineral royalty law that regulates the use of these resources and enables the canton to distribute concessions to firms. Three different concessions are relevant in this context: the exploration concession gives a firm the right to explore the occurrence of shale or tight gas for a limited period of time; the concession for site development allows firms to build access routes and infrastructure; and the exploitation concession enables them to economically exploit unconventional gas resources. The protection of natural resources, which in the case of unconventional gas extraction mainly concerns the protection of drinking water, air quality and ecosystems, is regulated by national law, i.e. by the Federal acts of waters and the environment. All constructions that could potentially cause harm to natural resources, ecosystems and the environment have to be evaluated by an Environmental Impact
Assessment. This assessment is also one of the basic principles that sub-national authorities use in their evaluation of a concession request.
Scenarios for policy change
In this institutional and regulatory context, different scenarios are possible as the new issue of hydraulic fracturing for unconventional gas development enters the political agenda. On the one hand, the exploitation of unconventional gas could be treated as any other form of mineral and gas development by the cantons. As soon as the respective projects fulfil the regulatory standards they could receive a concession. Mostly actors who consider shale gas development by hydraulic fracturing as a way to foster economic competitiveness are thus expected to favor the regulatory status quo. They see unconventional gas development as a chance rather than a threat. On the other hand, actors might perceive hydraulic fracturing as a threat, mainly because of the potential damage to ecosystems and other natural resources. They should thus favor a change of the existing regulation. More concretely, they oppose the current case-by-case evaluation of concession requests and promote policy change in the sense of stronger state intervention (such as bans or moratoriums).
In this context, the role played by cantonal authorities is key. Under the current regimes, cantonal authorities hold the property rights over minerals and gas and the competence for attributing
concessions. Yet, public authorities are also those that are held accountable if a case should create negative externalities, such as drinking water pollution or environmental degradation. This would mean that cantonal authorities did not appropriately evaluate the potential risks of a planned project. If cantonal authorities perceive the risk related to projects of hydraulic fracturing as too high, they might ally with actors in favor of policy change and work towards stronger state intervention and regulation. However, the opposite scenario is also possible (see, for example, the UK chapter in this book): public authorities might give more weight to the economic potential of unconventional gas development for the respective region and thus favor a legislative status quo.
Cases and comparison
For our comparative case study we investigate three cantons in which the issue of unconventional gas development applying hydraulic fracturing is on the political agenda: Neuchâtel, Bern, and Vaud.
In other cantons, there is either no geological potential for gas exploitation and/or the issue is not on the political agenda. An analysis of parliamentary motions in all 26 Swiss cantons revealed that h d auli f a tu i g is the issue of more than two parliamentary motions in only six cantons (besides the ones we selected: Fribourg, Thurgau, and Genève). Whereas an existing exploration concession has been suspended in Fribourg, the debates in Geneva and Thurgau mostly concern projects in neighboring countries (France for Geneva, Germany for Thurgau).
The cantons of Bern, Vaud and Neuchâtel all have recent experiences with concessions for the exploration of natural gas in the context of hydraulic fracturing (although the method has never been applied to extract shale or tight gas), and all have recently introduced regulatory frameworks on the issue. In Neuchâtel, one gas company (Celtique Energie) was interested in exploring the potential for gas extraction and engaged in preliminary discussions with cantonal authorities about an exploration concession. Through an informal agreement, the canton confirmed in 2010 that no other company than Celtique Energie would be considered for a concession until the company decided whether or not to apply for an exploration concession. Both conventional and unconventional (shale) gas was expected to be present in the canton of Neuchâtel, although Celtique Energie was officially only interested in conventional resources. However, opponents and the press had access to a confidential document, which argued that shale gas deposits are estimated to be 20 times higher than conventional gas sources in the canton. Finally, Celti ue E e gie's prospective drilling project in Valde-Travers induced political opposition in the form of repeated parliamentary initiatives and public mobilization. Most organizations opposing drilling highlighted that the area of Val-de-Travers is the drinking water rese oi of 7 % of the a to 's i ha ita ts. This eventually led to a moratorium in 2014 on all types of gas exploration and exploitation for ten years. A new cantonal mining law is currently in preparation, which will contain an explicit ban on shale gas exploration and extraction. The first canton to pass a moratorium on shale gas extraction (later extended to all unconventional gas sources) was Vaud in 2011, following neighboring France. It was installed as a response to a parliamentary interpellation, arguing that risks and environmental dangers are perceived as too high and national coordination should be reached first. The delivery of concessions for unconventional gas is thus currently suspended. Three gas companies held exploration concessions in the past (Celtique Energie, Seag and Petrosvibri), one of which (Petrosvibri) received a drilling permission and found tight gas. The period investigated in the canton of Vaud starts in 2006 with the first investigations into the exploration of tight gas reserves and ends in 2014. Yet, there has been low public and media attention on the issue since the introduction of the moratorium in 2011.
It appears that some degree of deviation from the former legislative situation (i.e. the status quo)
can be observed in all three cantons. Whereas in Neuchâtel and Bern unconventional gas development through hydraulic fracturing is or will be banned completely; the deviation from the former status quo (application of the mineral act and concession attribution) is smallest in the canton of Vaud (as a moratorium is less strict than a ban). Put differently, the degree of policy change is lowest in Vaud (Table 1) . The subsequent sections will analyze whether the coalition structures and attributes can account for the observed differences among the three cantons. Three exploration concessions. Moratorium on shale gas that was later extended to all unconventional gas developments.
Moderate policy change.
Data and method
Subsystem boundaries are defined according to the current legislative setting. The regulation in the sub-national jurisdictions has been explained above. Within these subsystems, collective actors from the public and private sectors were identified based on an in-depth analysis of official documents, media articles and secondary sources; and following a three-fold approach (see Laumann et al., 1983) . First, according to the positional approach, all actors being formally competent and legally concerned by unconventional gas exploitation regulation in the respective canton were included in the preliminary list of actors. Second, following the decisional approach, all actors that were active (i.e., media appearances, consultation procedures, parliamentary motions, etc.) in the policy process and related debate were added to this list. Third, by asking survey respondents to indicate whether any important actors were lacking on these lists included in the survey (reputational method), we made sure to have a complete list of important actors. 5 This resulted in a total of 34 actors for Neuchâtel, 27 for Bern, and 25 for Vaud, respectively, which received our survey. The reason for being able to take into account more actors for the analysis based on network data is that network questions produced passive data for actors that were included in the survey, but that data did not answer the question. While the e is o a ti e data ased o thei o a s e s, the e still is passi e data o these a to s ased o the espo ses of the othe a tors.
We rely on two different survey questions in order to identify advocacy coalitions and their beliefs and policy preferences (see Appendix B). First, and based on the question with which organization survey partners were in agreement or disagreement about policies to regulate unconventional gas extraction, an adjacency matrix is created. Cells in the matrix indicate if an actor in a row agrees with (+1), disagrees with (-1), or is indifferent with respect to the position of another actor in a column.
Based on this data, a formal network analytical procedure ( ala e -procedure in Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 1996) ) identifies groups of actors with a maximum of agreement and a minimum of disagreement within the groups, and a maximum of disagreement and a minimum of agreement between groups. The group structure with the lowest error term (the error term indicates the amount of o g ties, i.e. disagreement within or agreement across groups) was selected.
Second, a set of six policy positions related to unconventional gas development (energy sufficiency, e o o i effi ie , a ket o petiti e ess, e ologi al effe ti e ess, itize s' se u ity, and social equity) were aggregated into three dimensions (economic efficiency and competition, ecological awareness, and social equity). Additionally, ten types of environmental regulations (including air and water quality control, infrastructure security and the compensation of local communities) and five policies regulating the use of unconventional gas (exploitation, exploration, site development, moratorium, ban) were included. 7 Finally, the perceived threat related to hydraulic fracturing was evaluated by asking participants to rate the severity of ten potential problems that were grouped into three categories: threat to the environment and other resources (water, air, landscape); threat through competence reallocation; threat to the local communities and citizens. All policy positions, as well as the perceived threats, were evaluated on a 4-point Likert scale (from strongly agree to strongly disagree). This information was then triangulated with results from the coalition identification and helps to identify the ideological conflicts between opposing coalitions.
Besides the structure of coalitions, coordination patterns across and within coalitions were assessed.
This is based on a survey question asked actors to indicate other organizations f o the a to s' list with which they exchanged technical and political information. We defined technical information as information on the technical aspects of unconventional gas development, as well as scientific information on potential implications for the environment and neighboring population. Political information was defined as information related to political affairs, i.e. information that allows the organization to organize it's a ti ities during the policy process. Simple average values (corresponding to network densities) within and across coalitions show the relative frequency of information exchange.
A to s' resources are studied based on the reputational approach. We asked survey partners to indicate which organization from the same list of actors they viewed as particularly important with respect to the regulation of shale gas extraction. This information is then aggregated at the actorlevel (calculating the percentage of actors viewing a given actor as important), and finally by coalition. The aggregation at the coalition-level is computed as follows: first, we calculated the average reputational power of each coalition. Second, we calculated the sum of reputational power scores of all actors in a coalition. Both scores were then standardized (so that the total power of all coalitions sums up to 100%). Finally, we calculated the average between both scores to end up with a power score for each coalition.
Results
In what follows, we present the structure of coalitions, their beliefs and preferences, as well as their perceptions of threat. We discuss the areas of agreement and disagreement between actors in order to identify conflict lines and coalition boundaries. We further focus on coalition resources and strategies by taking into account political and technical information exchange among them.
Canton of Neuchâtel
In the policy process in the canton of Neuchâtel, one large coalition has a reputational power share of 0.71 and is composed of 25 actors. 8 It contains all units of the cantonal administration which are concerned by unconventional gas regulation, as well as the cantonal government and parliament (Table 2 ). The fact that seven NGOs are involved in this process is related to the rather advanced status of the respective drilling plans. Specific regional interests like tourism or fisheries are mobilized, and, alongside the classical environmental NGOs, oppose the drilling project in the Val-deTravers, a valley of the canton of Neuchâtel. All political parties, except the Liberal Democrats, are part of this coalition. Further members are two offices of the federal administration, the local university, as well as several municipalities. The policy positions and preferences of this large coalition indicate that its members display a strong ecological awareness (mean of 3.0, Figure 1 ), favor environmental regulation and wish to ban hydraulic fracturing. We thus label this coalition as anti-development . Furthermore, this coalition perceives hydraulic fracturing as a strong threat to the environment, as well as to local communities, and thinks that the existing competence allocation should change (shift from a delegation regime to a cantonal regulatory intervention).
The second coalition is much smaller and has a reputational power share of 0.29. It includes two federal offices, the economy-friendly Liberal Democrats, and the company Celtique Energie, which was interested in setting up drilling projects in the Val-de-Travers. Compared to the antidevelopment coalition, these four actors emphasize the social equity aspect (mean of 2.66, Figure 1) more than the other two policy dimensions of economic efficiency and ecological awareness. Yet, even though the economic efficiency score of 2.47 seems low, it is still considerably higher than the one of the anti-development coalition (1.91, Figure 1 ). The Liberal Party and the gas company
Celtique Energie have strong beliefs in favor of economic competitiveness and market freedom (see question 11, Appendix B). By contrast to the anti-development coalition, these four actors are in favor of exploitation and exploration concessions and thus the economic use of unconventional gas resources. Further, as compared to the anti-development coalition, they evaluate the threat induced The strong within-group exchange of political and technical information among members of the two distinct groups leads to the conclusion that we can definitely talk about two advocacy coalitions (in contrast to ad-hoc groups). We can further observe that both political and technical information exchange is more intense from the pro-development coalition towards the anti-development coalition than vice versa. Remember the specific context in this canton: the actors of the smaller coalition, and the company Celtique Energie more specifically, never explicitly planned to start a project in the canton using hydraulic fracturing techniques, but were instead hoping to drill using conventional methods. The fact that they have provided the actors of the anti-development coalition with quite a lot of information indicates that they tried to convince their competitors that their project would not involve hydraulic fracturing technologies. Accordingly, there is slightly more technical information exchange (0.20) than political information exchange (0.16) in the whole network, on average. Again, the pro-development coalition in particular intensively exchanges technical information within its coalition, as well as with members of the anti-development coalition.
The fact that both types of information exchange are quite intense might be due to the fact that coalitions in the canton of Neuchâtel had to deal with a rather concrete project, both on the technical and political level. As will be explained below, the situation is different in the two other cantons, and the corresponding figures are therefore lower.
Canton of Bern
The basic coalition structure in the canton of Bern is similar to in the structure in the canton of Neuchâtel: a larger and stronger coalition containing 17 actors opposes a smaller coalition composed of 5 actors. 11 The larger coalition has a reputational power share of 0.68 (Table 4) . Like in Neuchâtel, all cantonal administrative departments and offices concerned by the extraction of minerals from the ground, as well as the municipal utilit o pa E e g Wate Be e , belong to this first coalition,. Additionally, offices of the federal administration responsible for the environment and spatial planning, in addition to environmental NGOs, left and center parties, are involved in this coalition. Municipalities and regional agencies represent the interests of the locations of potential drilling projects. Finally, a private company dealing with geothermal energy projects is also part of this coalition. Again in line with Neuchâtel, the large coalition in Bern also shows high ecological awareness, favors environmental regulation, perceives hydraulic fracturing as a threat to the environment and to local communities, and prefers to ban or limit fracturing techniques (Table 4 and Figure 2 ). We again label it as the anti-development coalition .
The smaller coalition has a reputational power share of 0.32 and is composed of right-wing and economy-friendly political parties, a federal office and two companies active in the extraction of oil and gas from the soil (Table 4) . Contrary to the situation in the canton of Neuchâtel, the populistight " iss People's Pa t allies ith p o-development interests in Bern. This smaller coalition in Bern has stronger preferences for economic efficiency than the anti-development coalition (Figure 2 ). It perceives the threat towards the environment and local communities as less severe, and fears competence reallocations through new unconventional gas policies. Besides exploitation and exploration concessions of unconventional gas development, they also favor the development of drilling sites (Table 4) . Again, we identify it as the pro-development coalition .
unconventional gas development was a much more concrete and thus technical issue, these results
show that in the canton of Bern hydraulic fracturing is mainly a political issue. The political discourse is shaped by the launching of a popular initiative aiming at prohibiting gas extraction by means of hydraulic fracturing. The low amount of technical information exchanged between actors can be linked to the fact that although two exploration concessions were awarded, as of today no concrete project is under way.
Interestingly enough, there are stronger technical information flows from the pro-towards the antidevelopment coalition than vice versa. Even more importantly, and contrary to the situation in Neuchâtel, cross-coalition exchange from the smaller coalition to the larger coalition in Bern tends to be stronger than the within-coalition information exchange of the pro-development coalition. This result further confirms the rather low level of advocacy within the pro-development group: besides some considerable degree of disagreement, they also display only moderate levels of within-coalition coordination. Nevertheless, and as shown by the analysis of beliefs and preferences, they all agree on the further technological development and exploitation of unconventional gas in the canton of Bern.
Canton of Vaud
The coalition structure in the canton of Vaud is slightly different from the other two cantons, as we observe a somewhat more balanced coalition structure. 13 A first coalition includes 15 actors and has a reputational power share of 0.61 (Table 6 ). It includes the cantonal Parliament and Government, two administrative entities, as well as the City Council of Lausanne. Two actors from the Federal Administration as well as one environmental NGO also belong to this group. Finally, the left and center political parties provide the bulk of actors in this coalition. The information about agreement and disagreement between and within coalitions again shows the expected pattern, i.e. agreement within and disagreement between coalitions (Table 7 , left part).
While disagreement between coalitions is as strong as in the other cantons, within-coalition agreement is lower in the canton of Vaud. This indicates that although companies possess exploration concessions and there could be a potential for exploiting tight gas reserves, the issue is only weakly politicized in the canton of Vaud. The rather low levels of both political and technical information exchange (0.13 and 0.11 on average, respectively) further supports this interpretation of the situation in the canton of Vaud. Also, contrary to other cantons, levels of both types of information exchange are lower within the pro-development than within the anti-development coalitions.
Discussion
Since the recent arrival of hydraulic fracturing on the political agenda, we can observe policy change and deviation from traditional legislative practices concerning the use of gas and minerals in all three cantons. However, the degree of policy change and state intervention differs across the three cantons, and empirical results suggest that coalition structures and attributes are an important part of the explanation for these differences.
In Neuchâtel and Bern, a ban on hydraulic fracturing will be introduced. This corresponds to a strong cantonal intervention with respect to the use of unconventional gas resources. Accordingly, in both cases, we could identify a strong anti-development coalition (large in size and high reputational power score) that opposes unconventional gas development and the use of hydraulic fracturing.
Members of this coalition emphasize ecological awareness rather than economic efficiency, and favor stronger state intervention towards environmental protection. In both cases, this antidevelopment coalition was more successful than the pro-development coalition in translating beliefs into policy outputs. The latter is smaller in size and displays a significantly lower reputational power share in both cantons, which explains its lack of policy success. Pro-development members favor economic efficiency and concessions for gas exploration and exploitation. Furthermore, the threat perception differs considerably between the anti-and pro-development coalitions, and provides additional information on how and why the respective coalitions mobilized: the anti-development coalition perceives the threats towards the environment and local communities caused by hydraulic fracturing as much more important than the pro-development coalition. On the contrary, the prodevelopment coalition fears changes of the competence allocation and would favor the status quo, which is its preferred concession scheme (e.g. exploration, site development and exploitation).
Finally, regional public authorities join the anti-development coalition in Neuchâtel and Bern, as they share policy preferences and threat perceptions with their coalition members. They oppose the current case-by-case evaluation in mineral and gas exploitation and favor policy change via stronger state intervention.
In the canton of Vaud, the situation is slightly different. In this canton, no ban is planned, even though a moratorium is currently in place. Of course, other factors than the coalition structure, such as past experiences with policy instruments or influences from other sectoral subsystems, might also have an impact on the policy outputs and the degree of policy change observed in a subsystem. Yet, our analysis of the subsystem and the coalition structure allows us to identify important details. First, the information of agreement and disagreement between actors allows to clearly recognize conflict lines. In each of the three cases, the analysis of actors' agreement and disagreement relations resulted in the identification of two coalitions. However, average information exchange values and belief assessments revealed interesting differences between the three cantons. Actors have a high degree of agreement on policy beliefs and intensely share political and technical information within both coalitions in Neuchâtel. In Bern however, the pro-development group does not fulfil a crucial criteria of advocacy coalitions: even though the five minority actors share similar, mostly pro-economic beliefs and wish to further develop the use of hydraulic fracturing in the canton, they tend to disagree with each other on their preferred type of regulation, and their internal information exchange is much less intense than within the pro-development coalition in Neuchâtel. This might be an important reason why they are not successful in challenging the anti-development coalition in order to achieve a political compromise. Finally, the two coalitions in the canton of Vaud largely agree on policy positions, threat perceptions and some policy preferences. They only disagree on the concrete regulation regarding the use of hydraulic fracturing to be introduced: the first coalition including one green NGO, center and left parties prefers banning fracturing activities; the second coalition consisting among others of the Liberal Democrats and a gas company, prefers its further development.
Second, the reputational power analysis reveals that it is not only the size of a coalition in terms of the number of actors that matters. In the cantons of Neuchâtel and Bern, the anti-development coalitions are not only large in terms of the number of members, but are also stronger with respect to their reputational power. This strength, or the respective weakness of the pro-development coalitions, also signifies that the latter could not take advantage of direct-democratic instruments.
The anti-development coalitions did not feel threatened by a potential ex-post political turnaround by the pro-development coalitions or some single opponent organizations. The pressure on the Swiss energy sector since the governmental announcement of nuclear phasing out could have created an opportunity for minority coalitions to threaten the process (see Kübler, 2001; Nohrstedt, 2007 ). Yet, potential risks induced by fracturing techniques and doubts about the economic potential were largely dominant in the discourse, and the pro-development coalitions were unable to impose their beliefs (see also Cairney et al., in this book).
Also in the canton of Vaud, the anti-development coalition displays a significantly higher reputational power share than the pro-development coalition, but the difference is slightly less pronounced than in the other two cases. Furthermore, and as mentioned above, there is less ideological conflict between both coalitions, which might explain the less radical policy change in Vaud.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to explain why different Swiss cantons produce divergent policy solutions after a new issue, such as hydraulic fracturing for unconventional gas exploitation, appears on the political agenda. We assumed that coalition structures and attributes influence the degree of policy change and state intervention. Results confirm that the two policy processes in the cantons of Neuchâtel and Bern, which either limit or ban hydraulic fracturing in unconventional gas exploitation, are characterized by a very powerful anti-development coalition including public authorities and other organizations which are reluctant in relation to unconventional gas exploitation. In contrast, the canton of Vaud has the most extensive experience with gas exploration concessions and does not foresee any ban, but currently also has a moratorium on unconventional gas extraction. This more moderate policy change in Vaud was produced by a subsystem where ideological conflicts and divergences in threat perceptions are less pronounced.
These results largely confirm our assumptions on the relation between coalition structures, on the one side, and the policy outputs, on the other. Still, we wish to highlight two specificities: first, the current policy outputs analyzed in this study are not fixed, but might again change over time. Most policy processes on unconventional gas development and hydraulic fracturing in Switzerland are still ongoing. There is a debate on the national level about whether the national rather than the cantonal governments should produce a final regulatory arrangement 15 . Furthermore, the policy processes
are not yet finished in the three cantons either. In Neuchâtel for instance, a ban is planned, but still depends on the outcome of the respective legal revision. Additionally, in the case with a moratorium (Vaud), hydraulic fracturing restrictions are set for a certain period of time only: after this deadline, policy solutions will have to be renegotiated.
Second, and as shown in the other European chapters in this book, hydraulic fracturing is a relatively new technology and an even newer policy issue. The subsystems observed in this study are thus nascent : the relational profiles among political actors, as well as their policy beliefs, are probably not stable yet. They might very well change in the future, especially if new knowledge about the issue of hydraulic fracturing and the exploitation of unconventional gas is gained by subsystem actors. It would thus be important to investigate the situation some years from now and see whether our assumptions can also be confirmed at a more mature stage of the respective policy subsystems.
What are the specificities of the Swiss case in general, and of the empirical results in the three cantons in particular? In general, the Swiss institutional setting is strongly characterized by its consensus democracy and the existence of direct-democratic instruments. Both characteristics potentially challenge coalitions, as they force them to not simply impose their preferences, but to seek political compromise (Fischer, 2014) . However, due to lack of popular support, the prodevelopment coalitions were not able to challenge the anti-development coalition. Even if Switzerland is preparing for an energy turnaround and a phasing out of nuclear power in the medium term, this does not seem to put enough pressure on larger coalitions opposing the use of hydraulic fracturing. What is more, installing drilling sites in Switzerland is no easy task: aside from the fact that the areas with potential gas resources are densely populated, Switzerland has strong landscape and environmental protection laws. Until now, the economic potential of unconventional gas development does not seem to have been strong enough, and uncertainties related to risks induced by hydraulic fracturing techniques are still too great (see the UK chapter in this book). The trade-off between the use of new energy sources and current environmental and landscape protection regulation is also important in the current situation. In the face of uncertainty and a rather negative image of hydraulic fracturing among the general population (see the German chapter in this book), the balance is clearly on the side of environmental and landscape protection. What is more, the federalist and direct-democratic setting gives important power to local communities that would be affected by negative externalities from drilling sites.
This tendency is also confirmed by current initiatives seeking to shift competences for hydraulic fracturing regulation from the regional to the national level (a comparable development can be observed in Sweden and Germany, see respective chapters in this book). This would induce a reframing of the issue away from the use of natural resources towards the protection thereof. More concretely, the sub-national units are in charge of natural resource exploitation, whereas the national level is responsible for overall environmental protection. It is certainly no coincidence that the national Green Party, through a parliamentary motion, is asking for a shift in competences towards the central level. 16 The example of unconventional gas development in Switzerland thus nicely shows the interplay between subsystem-specific characteristics, on the one hand, and the general institutional setting which shapes these subsystems, on the other. Policy solutions strongly depend on the level responsible for decision-making and the definition of subsystem boundaries. Switzerland does not yet have a final policy solution in relation to unconventional gas exploitation using hydraulic fracturing techniques. Further research will thus be both necessary and highly interesting. Following the opinion of your organization, please indicate the extent to which the following issues are current problems related to unconventional gas development: 1 not a problem, 2 minor problem, 3 moderate problem, 4 serious problem.
Canton Vaud
Issues to be selected: 
